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The Status of Enforcing Fiduciary Duties in a Limited
Partnership After Dupuis v. Becnel Co.
Louisiana courts have adhered to the traditional rule barring suits
among partners prior to dissolution. Louisiana jurisprudence adopted
this rule from the common law states, where the rule still exists in
the area of general partnerships. Our courts have applied this rule to
both general partnerships and to limited partnerships, without consid-
eration of the clear differences between the two forms of business
associations. In a recent decision, however, the Louisiana Supreme
Court abrogated this rule and expressly overruled all prior cases which
had held that a partner was barred from maintaining an action prior
to the dissolution of the partnership.
The case, Dupuis v. Becnel Co.,' involved a Louisiana limited
partnership formed as part of a commercial real estate transaction.
Five years after formation, the limited partners brought an action
against the general partners, alleging among other claims that the
general partners had breached their fiduciary duties. The limited part-
ners sought damages for the general partners' actions or, in the al-
ternative, a dissolution and an accounting of the partnership. The
general partners defended the claim for damages by asserting the tra-
ditional rule barring actions between partners prior to dissolution. 2
The Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal, applying the tra-
ditional rule, held that the action by the limited partners was barred
prior to dissolution.3 The court recognized that other Louisiana circuits
had developed exceptions to the traditional rule, 4 but chose not to
follow those decisions. The proper remedy for the limited partners,
said the court, was a proceeding for dissolution and accounting, not
an action for damages against the general partners.
On review, the Louisiana Supreme Court unanimously overruled
the court of appeal's decision and, in doing so, abolished the traditional
rule barring suits between partners. Writing for the court, Justice
Copyright 1989, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. 535 So. 2d 375 (La. 1988).
2. The general partners also argued that the limited partners could not withdraw
by forcing a dissolution because the partnership had been formed for a thirty-five year
term.
3. Dupuis v. Becnel Co., 527 So. 2d 18 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988).
4. Beninate v. Bruno, 497 So. 2d 1022 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1986); Dohm v. O'Keefe,
458 So. 2d 964 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 460 So. 2d 1046 (1984).
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Watson stated that since no statutory authority supported the rule, it
"must fall.''5
While the result reached in Dupuis may seem correct and in keeping
with a nationwide trend, the reasoning of the court is open to criticism.
Dupuis presented an opportunity for the court to clear up the confusion
regarding the enforcement of fiduciary duties. But instead of formu-
lating a policy for lower courts to follow, the Dupuis decision poses
more questions than answers.
The purpose of this note is to analyze the abrogation of the
traditional rule and its effects on Louisiana partnership law. The anal-
ysis begins with the history of the rule in Louisiana and in other
states. Next, the Dupuis decision is discussed. Finally, a better method
of enforcing fiduciary duties with regard to limited partnerships will
be suggested.
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Rights of a Limited Partner at Common Law
Because limited partnerships can be traced to early French law, it
is not surprising that its origin in the United States did not begin in
the common law states. 6 Louisiana was the first 'state to adopt the
limited partnership concept.7 The concept was soon embraced by other
states, the first being New York in 1822.8 The courts, however, strictly
interpreted and enforced the enabling legislation. The 'slightest deviation
from the terms of the enabling statute9 exposed limited partners to
unlimited liability. This state of affairs quite naturally diminished the
attractiveness of the limited partnership.
The Uniform Limited Partnership Act (ULPA) was introduced in
1916 to remedy the courts' harsh treatment of'limited'partners. 0 The
ULPA made great strides in protecting the limited partner from un-
5. Dupuis, 535 So. 2d at 378.
6. Limited partnerships can be traced to the twelfth century. they developed as a
means for capitalists to enjoy a passive investment with limited liability. From this early
concept, the modern notion of limited partnership evolved. For a good discussion on the
history of limited partnerships, see Comment, Standing of Limited Partners to Sue De-
rivatively, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1463 (1965) [hereinafter Comment, Standing of Limited
Partners], and Comment, An Examination of Louisiana Limited Partnership-The Part-
nership in Commendam, 55 Tul. L. Rev. 515 (1981).
7. See Comment, Partnership in Commendam-Louisiana's Limited Partnership, 35
Tul. L. Rev. 815, 817 (1961) [hereinafter Comment, Partnership in Commendam]; Com-
ment, Standing of Limited Partners, supra note 6. '
8. Comment, Standing of Limited Partners, supra note 6, at 1464.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1465.
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limited personal liability by expressly allowing limited partners to take
part in certain partnership transactions without violating the provision
restraining their management of the partnership." However, beyond
the permissive activities of the ULPA, section 7 forbade the limited
partners from taking part in control of the partnership at the risk of
unlimited liability.12 The general partners could control the business
without fear of interference from the limited partners. This division
of power created ample opportunities for fraudulent self-dealing and
mismanagement. 3 To make matters worse, the limited partner was
refused any effective judicial relief when the general partner took
advantage of the opportunities for misconduct, for section 26 of the
ULPA was interpreted as barring a limited partner from being a proper
party in a suit for damages against the general partner. 4 This left the
limited partner unable to protect his investment because of his limited
authority but lacking procedural capacity to sue the general partner
for mismanagement. The limited partner had only two options: either
he could sue for dissolution of the partnership or he could withdraw
upon six months notice. 5 Neither remedy offered the limited partner
much protection in the interim.
11. Uniform Limited Partnership Act [hereinafter ULPA] § 10 gave limited partners
the right to demand information through inspection of the partnership books, to demand
a formal accounting under certain circumstances, to seek a dissolution of the partnership
by court order, and to share in the profits by way of a salary or income. ULPA § 13
allowed the limited partner to loan money and transact other business with the partnership.
12. ULPA § 7 provides:
A limited partner shall not become liable as a general partner unless, in addition
to the exercise of his rights and powers as a limited partner, he takes part in
the control of the business.
13. See Comment, Procedures and Remedies in Limited Partners' Suits for Breach
of the General Partner's Fiduciary Duty, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 763 (1977).
14. ULPA § 26 provides:
A contributor, unless he is a general partner, is not a proper party to proceedings
by or against a partnership, except where the object is to enforce a limited
partner's right against or liability to the partnership.
15. ULPA § 16 provides in pertinent part:
(1) A limited partner shall not receive from a general partner or out of partnership
property any part of his contribution until
(a) All liabilities of the partnership, except liabilities to general partners and
to limited partners on account of their contributions, have been paid or there
remains property of the partnership sufficient to pay them,
(b) The consent of all members is had, unless the return of the contribution
may be rightfully demanded under the provisions of paragraph (2), and
(c) The certificate is cancelled or so amended as to set forth the withdrawal
or reduction.
(2) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (1) a limited partner may rightfully
demand the return of his contribution
(a) On the dissolution of a partnership, or
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While this was the prevailing policy of the courts, it is unclear
whether this was the result intended under the ULPA. More specifically,
some doubt exists whether the purpose of section 26 was to bar all
actions by limited partners on partnership matters. A few decisions
state that the provision was intended to keep the general partners from
interfering in the litigation process, which is normally handled by the
general partners.1 6 This explanation is not particularly persuasive, for
section 7 of the ULPA already restricted the limited partner's involve-
ment in the operation of the business. The most plausible explanation
for section 26 is that it satisfied a procedural concern by avoiding the
necessity of joining the limited partners in suits by or against the
partnership. 7 Whatever its intended purpose, section 26 as interpreted
relegated limited partners to ineffective remedies for enforcing fiduciary
duties owed by the general partners to the partnership.
It was not until the mid-1960's that courts began to analogize the
position of the limited partner to that of a corporate shareholder, who
enjoyed the remedy of a shareholder derivative suit to enforce the
fiduciary duties of corporate directors.' 8 The seminal decision came
from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
(b) When the date specified in the certificate for its return has arrived, or
(c) After he has given six months' notice in writing to all other members, if
no time is specified in the certificate either for the return of the contribution
or for the dissolution of the partnership.
[Subsections 3 and 4 are omitted]
After the 1976 revision, Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act [hereinafter
RULPA] § 603 (1976) states:
A limited partner may withdraw from a limited partnership at the time or upon
the happening of events specified in the certificate of limited partnership and
in accordance with the partnership agreement. If the certificate does not specify
the time or the events upon the happening of which a limited partner may
withdraw or a definite time for the dissolution and winding up of the limited
partnership, a limited partner may withdraw upon not less than 6 months' prior
written notice to each general partner at his address on the books of the limited
partnership at its office in this State.
16. Klebanow v. New York Produce Exchange, 344 F.2d 294, 298 (2d Cir. 1965).
See also Comment, Standing of Limited Partners, supra note 6, at 1475, which states
this proposition while citing several authorities.
17. The common law and the ULPA embraced an aggregate view of partnerships.
That is, the partnership was not considered a distinct legal entity, but rather an aggregate
group of relationships between its members. Therefore, when the partnership was involved
in litigation, all of its members must be named as the partnership lacks an individual
identity. See Comment, Standing of Limited Partners, supra note 6, at 1475.
18. Hecker, Limited Partners' Derivative Suits Under the Revised Uniform Limited
Partnership Act, 33 Vand. L. Rev. 343, 343-44 (1980), states that limited partnerships
grew in number, size and economic importance in 1960's and 1970's with the advent of
sophisticated tax shelter planning.
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the case of Klebanow v. New York Produce Exchange.19 Klebanow
involved a suit brought by limited partners on behalf of the partnership
to enforce the fiduciary duties owed by the general partners to the
partnership. The general partners had refused to maintain an action
because they themselves would be included as defendants. The federal
district court dismissed the action, citing the New York version of
section 26 of the ULPA. By strictly construing this law, as had most
courts interpreting section 26, the court concluded that the limited
partners could not sue the general partners for mismanagement so long
as the partnership existed. 20
The Second Circuit refused to interpret the New York provision
so narrowly and reversed the lower court's decision. 21 Judge Friendly,
writing for the court, read the New York version of section 26 to
mean only that limited partners need not be joined in an action by
or against the partnership. 22 The judge also stated that another intended
purpose of section 26 was to restrain limited partners from interfering
in management of the business. 2a This reading allowed the possibility
of a derivative action by the limited partners.
The judge concluded that a limited partner derivative action was
the best alternative. First, Judge Friendly likened a limited partner to
a corporate shareholder. Both expect to share in the profits of the
business; both are subordinated to outside creditors; and both enjoy
limited control of the business through their authority to vote on
internal matters. The telling difference between the two types of inves-
tors was that while the shareholder could bring an action on behalf
of the corporation against those who controlled, the directors, the
limited partners had no similar right against those who controlled the
limited partnership, the general partners. Judge Friendly next recognized
that both investors take the risk of self-dealing and mismanagement
by those in control of the entity; however, while the corporate share-
holder could seek redress through a derivative action, the limited part-
ners' only remedy was withdrawal or dissolution. Dissolution, however,
is often an expensive way to enforce fiduciary duties. 24 Furthermore,
withdrawing from the partnership when there were still existing claims
meant that the withdrawing partner would receive too little for his
interest. The only sensible solution to the difficulties limited partners
faced, concluded Judge Friendly, was a partnership derivative action.
19. 344 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1965). See also Comment, supra note 13 for a discussion
of the Klebanow decision.
20. N.Y. Partnership Law § 115 (McKinney 1988).
21. Klebanow, 344 F.2d at 298.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
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The limited partners were allowed to pursue claims on behalf of the
partnership, with any recovery being paid directly to the partnership.
Initially, the New York courts did not follow Klebanow. 25 But the
issue was ultimately settled in Riviera Congress Associates v. Yassky. 26
Here, the highest court of New York held that a limited partner may
sue derivatively when the general partners wrongfully failed to enforce
partnership claims. The Riviera court interpreted section 26 as only
restraining the limited partners from interfering with the rights of the
general partners to manage the business. 27 Next, the court followed
Judge Friendly's analogy of the limited partner to the corporate share-
holder and found that the limited partner required protection from
mismanagement just as the shareholder. To reconcile this new right
with its interpretation of section 26, the court reasoned that when the
general partners wrongfully refuse to pursue proper claims of the
partnership, they are not carrying out their duties to manage the
business. Therefore, concluded the court, a derivative action did not
interfere with the management of the partnership. Although the court's
reasoning was rather weak, the Riviera decision set the course for
subsequent decisions recognizing the right of a limited partner to bring
a derivative action.28
After the Klebanow and Riviera decisions, both New York and
Delaware amended their partnership laws to give limited partners the
statutory right under certain circumstances to sue on behalf of the
partnership. 29 The 1976 Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act
(RULPA) incorporated similar provisions 0 In effect, these new pro-
visions allow a limited partner to maintain a derivative action, a
procedure that resembles Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and similar state laws.3 1 Presently, thirty-nine states have
adopted a version of these provisions of the RULPA.3 2
25. Millard v. Newmark & Co., 24 A.D.2d 333, 266 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1966).
26. 18 N.Y.2d 540, 223 N.E.2d 876 (Ct. App. 1966).
27. Id. at 543, 223 N.E.2d at 879.
28. Phillips v. Kula, 2 Haw. App. 206, 629 P.2d 119 (1981); McCully v. Radack,
27 Md. App. 350, 340 A.2d 374 (1975); Jaffe v. Harris, 109 Mich. App. 786, 312 N.W.2d
381 (1981); Strain v. Seven Hills Assocs., 75 A.D.2d 360, 429 N.Y.S.2d 424 (1980).
29. N.Y. Partnership Law § 115 (McKinney 1968); Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 1732
(1974).
30. RULPA §§ 1001-04 (1976).
31. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1. A listing of state provisions can be found in DeMott,
Demand in Derivitive Actions: Problems of Interpretation and Function, 19 U.C.D. L.
Rev. 461, 463-64 n.3 (1986).
32. Thirty-eight jurisdictions have adopted the RULPA as of Jan. 1, 1989. New York
has not incorporated the Act but allows for a derivative action by a similar statute, N.Y.
Partnership Law § 115-a (McKinney 1968). Indiana, a state not adopting the Act, has
prospectively repealed their § 26 statute, Ind. Code Ann. § 23-4-2-26 to be abrogated on
July 7, 1993.
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Harsh Treatment of the Limited Partner in Louisiana
Louisiana has never had a provision such as section 26 of the
ULPA that denied limited partners procedural standing. Instead, the
courts applied the same rule used in the general partnership context,
where partners are not allowed to sue each other during the existence
of the relationship. This jurisprudential rule can be traced back to
1821 in Louisiana when the common law rule barring an action between
partners was adopted. 3
Our courts adopted the common law rule despite Louisiana's dif-
ferent view of partnerships. Louisiana has consistently considered a
partnership a distinct legal entity, separate from its members. The
partnership enjoys its own legal identity. On the other hand, the
common law traditionally has conceptualized the partnership as a group
of personal relationships, a view commonly known as the aggregate
theory. The partnership at common law has no identity separate from
its individual members. Regardless of these differences, the justifica-
tions for the rule were compelling enough to convince our courts that
the rule should prevail in Louisiana.
This rule still exists in common law states, but only with regard
to general partnerships. The reasons behind such a rule still apply in
the context of a general partnership. All partners in a general part-
nership enjoy the authority to bind the partnership, and therefore trust
between the usually small number of partners is essential.34 In the
event of a lawsuit among the partners, this trusting relationship no
longer exists, and therefore it makes little sense for the partners to
remain in business together. This makes the rule requiring dissolution
before allowing a suit among partners a sensible prohibition.
It is also possible that courts took a pragmatic approach in deciding
to bar suits among partners during the existence of the partnership.
The courts would be unduly burdened if called upon to settle every
partnership dispute. Therefore, as a matter of judicial economy, the
rule could have been developed to force partners to dissolve the part-
nership if the partners could not settle their differences internally.
The most practical justification for the rule is to protect outside
creditors. If a partner were allowed to recover prior to settlement of
the partnership, the claims of creditors would in effect be subordinated
to the recovering partners."
33. Dromgoole v. Gardner's Widow & Heirs, 10 Mart. (o.s.) 433 (La. 1821).
34. Clay v. Grubbs, 1 Litt. 222 (Ky. 1822).
35. Other reasons have sometimes been forwarded. Early decisions held that to allow
an action between partners prior to dissolution would be a complicated procedure if one
partner were allowed to recover a judgment against a co-partner. Frink v. Ryan, 4 I11.
322, 325 (1841); Ivy v. Walker, 58 Miss. 253, 259 (1880); Devore v. Woodruff, I N.D.
19891 1223
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These reasons, along with the fact that there was no procedure at
common law for a partner to sue his co-partner with respect to part-
nership obligations, prompted courts to prevent suits between partners
during the partnership.3" Instead, the courts created an equitable remedy
for the partners, the action for dissolution. This remedy provided relief
without compromising the policy reasons for supporting the traditional
rule. The dissolution remedy is much like an involuntary corporate
liquidation, for encompassed in winding up the partnership's affairs
is the recovery of all claims of the partnership. The action for dis-
solution and accounting normally involves the recovery of all claims
of the partnership and the distribution of the assets to creditors and
owners in accordance with the priority of their respective claims.37 The
recoverable claims may include those against partners who have ap-
propriated partnership assets to their personal use, or those against
any partner for a breach of fiduciary duty that detrimentally affects
the partnership. 8 These are viewed as assets of the partnership and
are recovered before the payment of creditors or the distribution to
the partners.3 9
Many Louisiana decisions seem to rest on the assumption that the
rule requires a dissolution in which claims for breaches of fiduciary
duties by a partner are ignored. Allegations of wrongdoing could only
be considered in a subsequent proceeding. That interpretation made
no sense because it precluded a dissolution in which all of the assets
of the partnership were collected prior to distribution to the partner-
ship's claimants.
By misconstruing and misapplying the dissolution concept, a true
dissolution was not taking place. The partnership owned valid claims
against the partners at the time of the dissolution, but these claims
143, 150, 45 N.W. 701, 703 (1890). This would only confuse the accounting process of
the dissolution. Austin v. Vaughan, 14 La. Ann. 43 (1859); Gilliam v. Loeb, 131 Mo.
App. 70, 78, 109 S.W. 835, 837 (1908). Another reason given for the rule is that until
the partnership claims are settled, it is unclear whether the suing partner is a debtor or
creditor of the partnership. Stone v. Mattingly, 14 Ky. L. Rep., 113, 116, 19 S.W. 402,
403 (1892); Li Sai Cheuk v. Lee Lung, 79 Or. 563, 571, 156 P. 254, 256 (1916). See
also Story, J., The Law of Partnership, §§ 216-33 (1841).
36. See Story, supra note 35, §§ 221, 282-88 (1841).
37. This was accomplished even though the procedure was complicated as a result
of the common law aggregate theory of partnership. Uniform Partnership Act § 40 (1914).
See also Story, supra note 35, §§ 328, 347-49, 358-60; Rawly, Modern Law of Partnership,
§§ 571, 585-87 (1916).
38. State v. Ninth Judicial District Court, 50 Nev. 282, 257 P. 831 (1927); Gross v.
Gross, 128 A.D. 429, 112 N.Y.S. 790 (1908); Lyon v. Prescott, 103 Vt. 442, 156 A. 679
(1931).
39. With this approach, the common law action for dissolution and accounting
embraced Louisiana's entity view of partnerships, in contrast with the traditional common
law theory.
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were not included in the accounting or recovered before the final
distribution of assets. 40 Thus, when the partnership assets were liqui-
dated and distributed, outstanding assets remained. The courts simply
failed to see that a claim against the partner arising from the operation
of the partnership was a partnership asset. The effect of this application
was that the partner who had misappropriated partnership funds through
his self-dealing and mismanagement took more from the partnership
than he deserved, while the other partners received less. This also
affected outside creditors who may have been prejudiced by the in-
complete dissolution.
A 1951 Louisiana Supreme Court decision is cited frequently as
authority for Louisiana following the traditional rule. In Jeffries v.
Moore,4 one partner in a general partnership filed an action for the
dissolution and liquidation of the partnership, and requested settlement
of a claim against the other partner relating to the operation of the
business. The partnership owed no outside creditors. The supreme court
dismissed the claim against the partner, stating that "an action is not
maintainable between partners with respect to partnership transactions,
unless there has been an accounting or settlement of the partnership
affairs. ' 42 While the court's decision made little practical difference
because the partnership owed no outside debt, the holding shows the
importance the courts' view of the importance of the requirement of
dissolution prior to any action against a partner based on partnership
business.
The rule became applicable to limited partnerships by virtue of
the blending of concepts between general and limited partnerships.'
3
Rather than analyzing the theoretical and practical differences between
limited and general partnerships, courts tended to apply the rule to
both forms of partnership. This was unfortunate, because the position
of the limited partner differs greatly from the position of the ordinary
partner.
Partners of general partnerships have the authority to participate
in management and bind the partnership as an agent of the entity."
This authority balances the power in a general partnership among its
members. In a limited partnership, by contrast, only the general part-
40. Marine Services, Inc. v. A-I Indus., Inc., 355 So. 2d 625 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1978); Salsul Co. v. Kohlmeyer, 325 So. 2d 858 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 330
So. 2d 281 (1976); Lawrence v. Recoulley, 235 So. 2d 437 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970); In
re Nelson, 190 So. 2d 131 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
41. 219 La. 692, 53 So. 2d 898 (1951).
42. Id. at 698, 53 So. 2d at 900 (quoting from Annotation, Partners-Action at Law,
21 A.L.R. 34 (1922)).
43. See Comment, Partnership in Commendam, supra note 7, at 817.
44. La. Civ. Code art. 2814.
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ners enjoy this management and agency authority. The limited partners
are without such powers. 45 Indeed, the limited partner risks unlimited
personal liability if he does act as an agent of the partnership. 46 By
the nature of the relationship, the limited partner has very little pro-
tection against the general partner's mismanagement and self-dealing.
This puts most limited partners in about the same position as a minority
shareholder in a corporation who also exercise no agency powers and
are effectively subject to managements actions.
While this application of the rule exemplified the typical state of
affairs under Louisiana partnership law, some dissatisfaction with the
rule can be detected. One year after the Jeffries decision, the supreme
court allowed a suit by limited partners against general partners before
dissolution. In that case, Novick v. Miller,47 the limited partners sought
recovery of partnership assets that the general partners had withdrawn
through unauthorized salary increases. The court not only permitted
the claims to go forward prior to dissolution of the partnership, but
refused to grant dissolution at the limited partners' request. Instead,
the court ordered the general partners' salaries reduced and the funds
used for the raises to be returned and distributed equally among the
remaining partners.
The Novick court seems to have been correct in not demanding a
dissolution prior to the limited partners' action for breach of a fiduciary
duty against the general partners. However, the remedy granted-
allowing the limited partners to recover individually-undercuts one
valid policy underpinning of the traditional rule. The claims of the
limited partners are placed ahead of outside creditors. The traditional
role preserves the normal priority scheme, but granting the limited
partner an individual right of action prevents that scheme by subor-
dinating outside creditors to owners. The Novick decision, however
has not had much effect at all, good or bad, for it has not been
followed in the jurisprudence. 48
More dissatisfaction with the rule can be seen in the circuit courts'
attempt to carve out exceptions to the traditional rule when limited
partnerships were involved. In Dohm y. O'Keefe,49 the court held that
the alleged fraud of the general partners was a sufficient reason to
45. As mandated in the Civil Code, "[a] partner in commendam does not have the
authority of a general partner to bind the partnership, to participate in the management
or administration of the partnership, or to conduct business with the third parties on
behalf of the partnership." Id. art. 2843.
46. Id. art. 2844.
47. 222 La. 469, 62 So. 2d 645 (1952).
48. Sasul v. Kohlmeyer, 325 So. 2d 858 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 330 So.
2d 281 (1976).
49. 458 So. 2d 964 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 460 So. 2d 1046 (1984).
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allow the limited partners to sue before a dissolution had occurred.
The court also took a position similar to the Novick court's by viewing
the claim against the general partners as a personal right belonging to
the individual limited partner.5 0
In a later decision, the fifth circuit, in Beninate v. Bruno," upheld
the validity of an action brought by the limited partners against the
general partners prior to dissolution. The court reasoned that exceptions
to the traditional rule have been recognized in past decisions.12 Of
particular impact was the court's reliance on the 1980 revisions to the
Civil Code articles on partnerships. The court suggested that new article
2809, which establishes a fiduciary relationship between partners and
between the partnership and its partners, gives a partner the right to
maintain an action. But instead of actually considering the nature of
the claim, the Beninate court seemed to assume that this new right
was a personal right of the partner."
What is obvious from these decisions, beginning with Jeffries, is
that the courts have misunderstood the policies behind the rule that
bars actions between partners.14 Of all the common law justifications,
Louisiana courts chose to emphasize the need to protect outside cred-
itors. But the rule adopted was a misinterpretation of the common
law rule and actually damaged the interests of creditors by precluding
the consideration of a fiduciary duty claim as an asset of the partnership
in the dissolution proceeding itself. This rule also affected the interests
of other partners by forcing them to seek a dissolution of a going
concern in order to enforce the fiduciary duties owed by the general
partners to the partnership. It was this latter feature of the rule that
led the courts to struggle with the idea of allowing a pre-dissolution
suit for breaches of fiduciary duties owed to the partnership. In the
eyes of most courts, the traditional rule applied in all situations. Later
decisions, Dohm and Beninate in particular, indicate the courts began
to question this application of the rule, expecially when limited part-
nerships were involved. But by allowing pre-dissolution suits, these
courts created another problem by confusing another issue-who owns
the right to bring the action? As discussed, Dohm and Beninate assumed
that the individual partner owns the claim. Had the courts analyzed
the situations correctly, they would have concluded that the partnership
owns the claims for breaches of fiduciary duty owed to the partnership.
The positions taken by Louisiana courts suggest an ironic concep-
tual shift in the law of partnership. By granting the partner the right
50. Id. at 966.
51. 497 So. 2d 1022 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1986).
52. Id. at 1024 (citing Dohm, 458 So. 2d 964).
53. Beninate, 497 So. 2d at 1024.
54. See supra text accompanying notes 34-36.
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to bring a personal action, the courts have, in effect, abandoned the
Louisiana view that partnerships are a separate entity.5 This may have
caused problems at common law where the partnership had no separate
identity from its members.5 6 But Louisiana courts should have had no
conceptual difficulty in finding that the right belongs to the part-
nership.17 Instead the court confused the issues and simply applied a
single rule-no action among partners prior to dissolution.
By taking these positions, Louisiana courts have needlessly forced
themselves into a dilemma. If the court recognizes the partner's right
to recover individually for the mismanagement of another partner, it
allows the rights of other creditors with superior claims to be prejudiced
and interferes with the exercise of the general partner's management
powers. If the court denies the personal action to the partner, no
effective relief for the mismanagement is available other than disso-
lution. Until recently, the courts chose the latter, relegating the partners
to the dissolution remedy or a post-dissolution action for damages.
But dissolution and post-dissolution remedies often pose serious prac-
tical problems for the other innocent partners and outside creditors.
Forcing dissolution may result in the termination of a profitable going
concern and will almost always result in harsh tax consequences for
the partners. 8 Furthermore, a dissolution while partnership claims against
the general partners are still outstanding prejudices the creditors' rights
to a full settlement of their claims.
A good example of our courts' struggle over these issues came in
the third circuit decision of Dupuis v. Becnel Co.5 9 There, the appellate
court affirmed the application of the traditional rule in a pre-dissolution
action. But on review, the supreme court reversed.
55. Dupuis v. Becnel Co., 535 So. 2d 375 (La. 1988); Beninate v. Bruno, 497 So.
2d 1022 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1986).
56. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34. Louisiana considers a partnership a
distinct juridical person under Louisiana Civil Code article 2801. The common law,
however, views a partnership as an aggregate of agency relationships between its members.
57. La. Civ. Code art. 2801.
58. One situation that presents a harsh tax consequence is when the partnership is
forced to liquidate and sell appreciated assets. By way of review, a partnership pays no
income tax; rather, its partners are taxed individually on partnership income distributed
to them over the course of the partnership. Income from operations is usually distributed
over time, allocating the partners' tax liability evenly throughout this period. But when
a partnership holds an appreciating asset, such as real estate, the gain in value, also
considered income, is not distributed to the partners; therefore, no tax liability arises.
However, when this asset is liquidated upon dissolution, each partner must be distributed
his share of the gain, creating immediate tax liability. The partner is unable to spread
this distribution over time. For a good discussion of the tax consequences resulting from
dissolution of the partnership, see Comment, supra note 13, at 780-84.
59. 527 So. 2d 18 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988).
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DuPuIs IN THE SUPREME COURT
The facts of Dupuis typify the situation that has presented Louis-
iana courts with the most difficulty. A Louisiana limited partnership
was formed as part of a commercial real estate transaction. The part-
nership agreement provided that the plaintiffs would provide the land
and capital for the venture and serve as limited partners, leaving the
management of the business to the defendants, the general partners.
The limited partners began to suspect the defendants were wrongfully
withdrawing funds from the partnership. Hence, they filed an action
for damages, alleging the breach of fiduciary duties along with other
similar claims, and in the alternative sought a dissolution and ac-
counting.
The court of appeal, relying on the traditional rule, affirmed the
trial court's decision to strike all of the plaintiffs' allegations except
the claim for dissolution.60 The court's reasoning was based on Louis-
iana's misinterpretation of the common law rule against pre-dissolution
suits. The supreme court unanimously overruled the lower court de-
cision. In doing so, the court expressly overruled all prior cases that
made dissolution a condition precedent to a suit among partners.6' The
abrogation of the traditional rule in this situation is to be commended.
Several questions, however, remain unanswered after the Dupuis de-
cision. This section will examine the opinion and the rational expressed
by the court.
Theory of the Decision
The Dupuis decision is troubling in several respects. The major
concern relates to the court's formulation of the issue. The issue, as
seen by the court, is: "Prior to a partnership's dissolution, does a
partner have a cause of action against another partner for damages
caused by breach of fiduciary duties, fraud or negligence?" 62 The real
issue posed seemed to be whether, prior to completion of the disso-
lution, a limited partner may enforce the fiduciary duties owed to the
limited partner and the partnership. In misdescribing the issue as it
did, the supreme court put itself in the same dilemma the lower courts
had. The court assumed that an action brought to enforce fiduciary
duties owed to the partnership would be a "personal" right of action
held by the individual partners. This forced the court to choose between
the interest of the plaintiff partners in redressing alleged breaches of
fiduciary duty and the interests of other participants in the partnership,
60. Id. at 19.
61. Dupuis, 535 So. 2d at 378.
62. Id. at 376.
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including creditors and other partners, in having the partnership man-
aged by the general partners and in having its assets distributed in
accordance with the legislatively established order of priority.
The supreme court concentrated on two areas in abrogating the
traditional rule. First, the court emphasized the work of the Louisiana
Law Institute in revising the partnership articles. Special mention was
made of the adoption of articles 2808 and 2809 concerning the fiduciary
duties owed by the members of a partnership, 63 but beyond a general
mention of these articles, the decision failed to establish how the
revision impacted upon its conclusion.
The court's brief analysis of articles 2808 and 2809 contributed to
the confusion. The court noted the 1980 revision to the partnership
articles, specifically the inclusion of article 2809. Article 2809 expressly
creates fiduciary duties between partners, and the Beninate decision
had left open the possibility that article 2809 gives one partner a
personal right of action against another partner. However, the court's
belief that article 2809 gives one partner a personal right of action
against another partner was a conclusory assumption.
Several factors suggest that the supreme court's assumption is
erroneous. Certainly the legislative history does not compel the con-
clusion that article 2809 gives one partner a personal action against
another partner over partnership matters. The introduction to the re-
vised partnership articles, drafted by the Partnership Law Revision
Committee, states only that: "The Courts have long recognized that
fiduciary duties exist between partners towards each other and the
partnership, and the revision codifies this jurisprudential rule." 64 Article
2809 does appear to recognize that fiduciary duties are owed by part-
ners, not only to the partnership, but to the individual partners as
well. But this type of language has generally been interpreted so that
it protects the direct personal interests of a limited partner or share-
holder, for example, from being fraudulently induced into contributing
capital to the business, and not the indirect, collective interests of
partners and shareholders in the faithful and efficient management of
the partnership or corporation in which they have invested. 65 The
63. La. Civ. Code art. 2808 states:
Each partner owes the partnership all that he has agreed to contribute to it.
La. Civ. Code art. 2809 provides:
A partner owes a fiduciary duty to the partnership and to his partners. He
may not conduct any activity, for himself or on behalf of a third person, that
is contrary to his fiduciary duty and is prejudicial to the partnership. If he
does so, he must account to the partnership and to his partners for the resulting
profits.
64. Dupuis, 527 So. 18, 21 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988).
65. Grand Isle Campsites, Inc. v. Cheek, 262 La. 5, 262 So. 2d 350 (1972).
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analogous provision to article 2809 under the Louisiana corporate
statute66 has been held not to grant to a corporate shareholder a
personal right of action on a corporate claim.
67
What Dupuis and cases like it actually involve is breach of a duty
to the partnership, not the individual partner. This breach of duty
affects all members of the entity proportionately. There is no justifiable
basis for making the right to seek redress for all the partner's harm
into a personal right of the partner. This right must belong to the
entity itself. By ignoring that point, the supreme court left it unclear
what is to happen to other partners similarly situated and outside
creditors in the case of a predissolution action for the recovery of
damages arising out of an alleged breach of fiduciary duty. Following
the Dupuis approach, giving partners a personal right to assert part-
nership claims will make creditors effectively subordinate to the part-
ners' personal claims. Surely this is not what the court intended in its
decision, but its characterization may lead to this result in practice.
Granting the right to bring this type of action to the individual
partner rather than the partnership creates other problems besides the
inherent prejudice to outside creditors. If each partner holds a right
of action, there is no mechanism for dismissal of frivolous or non-
meritorious claims. Members of the partnership not associated with
the alleged mismanagement, who may not want the action to be filed
initially, or who would vote to dismiss the claim, are without the
authority to do so after the Dupuis decision. By recognizing the right
to prosecute the claim as a personal right, other members of the
partnership, even if they all agree, have no authority to dismiss the
suit.
The most significant result of recognizing the partner's personal
right of action concerns the possibility of uncertain liability for the
general partner who is sued. If any one partner has a private right
of action for the mismanagement of a general partner, then all partners
must be considered similarly situated. Under Louisiana's narrow version
of res judicata, a judgment in favor of the first partner to bring an
action would not preclude other partners from suing the same defendant
partner in a separate suit. 68 Effectively, a general partner found guilty
66. Louisiana Revised Statute 12:91 (1968) states that "officers and directors shall
be deemed to stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its shareholders."
67. Bordelon v. Cochrane, 533 So. 2d 82 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988); Beyor v. F & R
Oilfield Contractors, 407 So. 2d 15 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
68. La. R.S. 13:4231 (Supp. 1989) provides:
The authority of the thing adjudged takes place only with respect to what was
the object of the judgment. The thing demanded must be the same; the demand
must be founded on the same cause of action; the demand must be between
19891
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of mismanagement could be sued by every other partner in separate
proceedings and his liability would be uncertain, because the deter-
mination of damages may vary in each separate action. This is ob-
jectionable on several grounds. First, it creates the possibility of the
general partner being liable for an amount in excess of the actual
damages suffered once all the judgments are totalled. Second, the suing
partners may each receive different amounts of recovery for effectively
the same harm because of the different courts' assessment. Finally,
judicial economy is hardly served by this position, not to mention the
expense on the defendant partner. This problem could possibly be
solved by the court ordering the joinder of all the remaining partners
as necessary or indispensable parties, which would bind them to a final
judgment. 69 But this procedure would require potentially complicated
factual determinations under the joinder rules about the potential ef-
fects of a judgment in the suit on other partners and creditors. More-
over, it would not address the earlier concern of dismissing frivolous
actions.
Next, the court outlined numerous exceptions to the traditional
rule that were formulated in the Louisiana courts. Many of the so
called "exceptions," however, have nothing to do with breaches of
fiduciary duties such as in Dupuis. In fact, most of the cases are
outside the scope of the traditional rule because they involve situations
where the demand is based on a personal relationship between the
partners and does not affect partnership business.7 0 For instance, one
decision dealt with a tort action between partners, while another in-
volved an action over a private agreement of the partners, outside the
partnership agreement. These situations have nothing to do with the
traditional rule or with fiduciary duty claims. Nevertheless, the court
emphasized these decisions as recognized exceptions. Another exception
which the court relies on was established in Dohm v. O'Keefe.71 That
the same parties, and formed by them against each other in the same quality.
Welch v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 359 So. 2d 154 (La. 1978); Bowman v. Weill Con-
struction Co., 502 So. 2d 133 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 503 So. 2d 495 (1987).
69. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 641-44. See, e.g., Beninate v. Bruno, 497 So. 2d 1022,
1024 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1986).
70. Ingersoll Corp. v. Rogers, 217 La. 79, 46 So. 2d 45 (1950), is cited as an exception
to the general rule. However, Ingersoll involved a suit among partners arising from a
private agreement between the partners and not a claim that stemmed from a partnership
transaction. Thus, the claim was not within the protection of the general rule. To consider
the decision as an exception is a misnomer. Other cases cited by the court likewise have
no application to the general rule. Douglas v. Thomas, 489 So. 2d 449 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1986) (private agreement between the partners was involved); Kaufman & Enzer Joint
Venture v. Bethlan Production Corp., 459 So. 2d 60 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984) (the plaintiff
partner was a creditor of the partnership); Broillette v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 340 So.
2d 667 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976), writ denied, 342 So. 2d 1115 (1977) (suit was in tort).
71. 458 So. 2d 964 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984).
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case held that alleging fraud of the general partners will overcome the
traditional rule. 72 The problem with this analysis is that fraud is com-
monly pleaded. Moreover, the Dohm facts are not so extreme that the
abrogation of the traditional rule was compelled. Hence, the Dohm
exception provides little support for the Dupuis conclusion.
The true difficulty with the Dupuis decision is the lack of clarity
by the court in expressing reasons why the traditional rule was abol-
ished. The court does compile various quotes and statutory excerpts
in an attempt to justify its decision, but at best the court seems to
have merged unconnected concepts, some of which were totally irrel-
evant to the question before it.7" The most plausible conclusion is that
the court abrogated the rule based on an exception established in the
lower courts. Neither the supreme court nor the lower courts have
thought the problem out very carefully, and the Dupuis approach
creates serious problems for outside creditors and defendant partners.
After Dupuis, the question becomes whether the court has escaped
the dilemma it had forced itself into. Dupuis answers the question
whether an action for mismanagement and self-dealing may be brought
prior to dissolution in the affirmative, expressly overrules "prior cases
holding to the contrary." ' 74 Abrogation of the traditional rule in this
factual setting moves Louisiana law in an appropriate direction. The
majority of states now provide for pre-dissolution suits to enforce
breaches of fiduciary duties owed to the partnership.
When faced with the question of who owns the right to the action,
however, the decision has a negative impact on the law. By assuming
that the right belongs to the individual partner, the supreme court has
created enormous difficulties. Perhaps an escape from this dilemma
72. Id. at 966.
73. Dupuis, 535 So. 2d at 378 (quoting Comment, supra note 6, at 534). The court
stated:
By expressly stipulating that a fiduciary obligation exists, the Revision protects
the partner in commendam both prior to creation of the partnership and during
its existence. If the fiduciary duty is violated, the partner in commendam has
a right to bring an action for damages and lost profits.
The Tulane comment relies on an article from the Real Property, Probate and Trust
Journal as authority. See Roulac, Resolution of Limited Partnership Disputes: Practical
and Procedural Problems, 10 Real Prop. & Tr. J. 276 (1975), which discusses the general
partner's role as a fiduciary, but that does not support the contention that the general
partner is personally liable to the partner in commendam for a breach of fiduciary duty.
One situation where this would be the case is when a general partner breaches a duty
owed to the individual partner by defrauding the limited partner in inducing him to invest
in the business. The Roulac article clearly recognizes the general partner's duty to the
partnership as belonging to the partnership. Id. at 288. Thus, there is little foundation
for the statement "the partner in commendam has a right to bring an action for damages
and lost profits" when a fiduciary duty owed to the partnership is breached.
74. Dupuis, 535 So. 2d at 378.
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remains, for one might argue that the issue of whether an individual
partner owns the right was not before the court, notwithstanding the
court's view. All indication, though, is that the court sees this right
as a personal one, owned by each partner individually.
The court could have reached a similar result but by a different
theory. Under this alternative theory, the integrity of the traditional
rule could have been preserved while at the same time providing a
pre-dissolution method of enforcing fiduciary duties owed to the part-
nership.
AN ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION
The Dupuis court could have used an approach that has been
widely accepted in most other states, the partnership derivative action.
As discussed earlier, the RULPA expressly created a derivative action
in favor of limited partners as a pre-dissolution mechanism for en-
forcing fiduciary duties owed by the general partners." The RULPA's
limited partnership derivative action is based in part on the marked
similarity between the limited partner and the corporate shareholder. 76
While Louisiana jurisprudence has not yet recognized the availa-
bility of a limited partner's derivative action, there is a compelling
need to do so in light of the present confusion of the courts over the
enforcement of fiduciary duties. The alternative of dissolution is an
onerous, unrealistic remedy for the limited partners. The Dupuis ap-
proach, creating a personal right of action in power of the limited
partner, is badly flawed as well. The derivative action solves both
problems.
Louisiana courts could recognize a limited partner's derivative ac-
tion without much difficulty. First of all, allowing a derivative action
would not create any theoretical difficulties. Unlike the common law,
Louisiana has never struggled with the idea of recognizing a partnership
as a distinct entity. 77 There should then be no question that a part-
nership may own a litigious right, such as a claim against the partners
for breach of fiduciary duties owed to the partnership.
Second, no new legislation would be needed. The Louisiana Code
of Civil Procedure articles governing shareholder derivative actions78
are broad enough to allow a partnership a derivative action. The articles
refer to shareholders of a corporation and "members" of an "unin-
corporated association" as proper parties in a derivative suit. 79 This
75. RULPA § 1001-04 (1976).
76. Hecker, supra note 18, at 356.
77. La. Civ. Code art. 2801.
78. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 591-611.
79. Id. arts. 593, 596, 611.
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language could reasonably be interpreted to included limited partners.80
Moreover, the derivative action solves all the problems created by
the recognition of a partner's personal right to enforce fiduciary duties
owed to the partnership. Outside creditors would be protected by the
requirement under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 596,'which
requires a prayer foi judgment in favor of the unincorporated asso-
ciation. 1 Because any recovery is paid to the partnership, creditors'
claims are not impaired. If a derivative action Were employed, 'the
partnership would own the claim; therefore, only the partnership would
be the proper party to receive the proceeds from a judgmeilt.82 The
priority of creditor's claims would be protected in this case because
the judgment would be an asset of the partnership. Therefore, if
dissolution is later required, creditors have maintained their positions
and have a better chahce of realizing full payment of their claims.
Thus, the concern of prejudicing creditors by recognizing a "partner's
direct right of action-on a partnership claim disappears with a derivative
action.
Article 596 requires the derivative plaintiff to make efforts to have-
the managing members maintain the action preserving the ability to
80. See Comment, supra note 6, at 539, where this suggestion is made. The Louisiana
Code of Procedure was derived from an earlier version of the Federal Rules Civil Procedure.
Nevertheless, the Louisiana articles and the older federal rules are nearly identical with
respect to the requirements for bringing a derivative action. Under the federal rules, an
"unincorporated association" has been interpreted to include a limited partnership. Colonial
Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 183 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817,
87 S. Ct. 40 (1966); In re King Resources Co., 420 F. Supp. 610 (D. Colo. 1976); Engl
v. Berg, 511 F. Supp. 1146, 1153 (E.D. Pa. 1981). See Hecker, supra note 18, at 375.
Moreover, several other federal decisions have held that an "unincorporated association"
under Federal Rules 17 and 23.2 includes both partnerships and limited partnerships.
Likewise, the Louisiana articles, containing the same language as Rule 23.1, could easily
be interpreted to allow a limited partner the procedural capacity to maintain a derivative
action. Pyle v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 16 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 634 (D. Or. 1972); Suchem,
Inc. v. Central Aguirre Sugar Co., 52 F.R.D. 348 (D.P.R. 1971); Lee v. Navarro Savings
Assoc., 416 F. Supp. 1186 (N.D. Tex. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 597 F.2d 421 (5th
Cir. 1979). See Hecker, supra note 18, at 375.
81. La. Code Civ. P. art. 596 states in pertinent part:
The petition in a class action brought by a shareholder or member of a cor-
poration or unincorporated association because it refuses to enforce a right
which it may enforce shall:
.... (4) Include a prayer for judgment in favor of the corporation or
unincorporated association and against the obligor on the obligation sought to
be enforced.
82. RULPA § 1004 (1976) states that if a derivative action is successful, the court
may award the plaintiff reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees. This payment is
taken from any proceeds realized in the suit, but the limited partner shall "remit to the
limited partnership the remainder of the proceeds received by him."
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dismiss frivolous claims. 83 Thus, by imposing a demand requirement
on the plaintiff partner, the derivative action protects against non-
meritorious claims.8 4 A plaintiff in a derivative action must make a
demand on management to either bring the action or provide reasons
for not doing so. This gives the general partners not connected with
the alleged mismanagement an opportunity to decide upon the validity
of the claim. Limited partners would be still protected by being excused
from making a demand on management if there are valid reasons for
not doing so.85
The most attractive feature of the derivative action is that it elim-
inates the res judicata concern. The issue of res judicata is resolved
in articles 591 through 597 and 61 1.86 All partners must join in the
action, meaning that a final judgment would bind all of them. Limited
partners would maintain the action on behalf of the partnership, not
themselves. The derivative action achieves the same results as would
a joinder of necessary or indispensable parties by giving effect to the
substantive rule of article 2801 of the Civil Code that a partnership
is an entity. It also protects the ability of management and other
partners to have non-meritorious suits dismissed. Thus, even under
Louisiana's narrow view of res judicata, a subsequent action by partners
similarly situated would be dismissed as pertaining to the same cause,
same demand, and the same parties.
The code also creates a multi-party derivative action in article 611.
If all partners cannot or will not join in the suit, these partners can
be made defendants in the action. Again, a final judgment would
preclude any subsequent suit by these partners. This protects the general
partner from multiple liability while providing the true plaintiff, the
partnership, with a procedure to enforce its claims.
The derivative action is the one solution that will afford limited
partners the needed protection from general partners' mismanagement
and self-dealing while preventing disruption of the business organization
or prejudice to creditors. It addresses all the problems created by
recognizing a personal right of action in each partner on claims for
83. La. Code Civ. P. art. 596(2) states that the petition must:
[A]llege with particularity the efforts of the plaintiff to secure from the managing
directors, governors, or trustees and, if necessary, from the shareholders or
members, the enforcement of the rights; and the reasons for his failure to secure
such enforcement; or the reason for not making such an effort to secure
enforcement of the right.
84. RULPA § 1003 (1976) requires:
In a derivative action, the complaint shall set forth with particularity the effort
of the plaintiff to secure initiation of the action by a general partner or the
reasons for not making the effort.
85. Id.
86. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 591-97, 611.
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breach of duties owed to the partnership. At the same time, this remedy
solves the dilemma created by the courts.
A counter argument that may be raised is that when the legislature
revised the partnership articles in 1980, the RULPA's derivative action
had already been adopted, yet the lawmakers chose not to include
these provisions in the revised articles. But, the legislature's failure to
act should not bar such an action, especially in light of the need for
the proceeding. The language of the RULPA is nearly identical to
Louisiana's civil procedure articles regulating derivative actions. Thus,
it would have been redundant for the legislature to adopt special
provisions for a limited partnership derivative action. The language of
articles 591 through 611 is flexible enough to conclude that a limited
partner already has the necessary procedural vehicle for enforcing the
partnership's claim through a derivative action.
CONCLUSION
The Dupuis decision is the classic example of the confusion existing
in Louisiana's courts over the enforcement of fiduciary duties in the
partnership context. The supreme court set out to give limited partners
more protection by abrogating the traditional rule barring actions among
partners prior to the completion of dissolution. This was an appropriate
aim, for while the rule still has practical significance with regard to
general partnerships, it makes little sense to apply it to the limited
partners. Instead of distinguishing the limited and general partnerships,
however, the court in Dupuis simply abolished the rule entirely, in-
dicating that a partner has a private right of action against his co-
partners prior to dissolution. It is unclear whether this was the issue
before the court. Dupuis could be read alternatively to hold that a
claim for mismanagement may be brought prior to dissolution. In this
sense, the decision appears to correct the prior confusion, which op-
erated to prejudice the claims of creditors by not including valid claims
of self-dealing and mismanagement as assets in the dissolution pro-
ceeding. But the court assumes that the partners are the owners of
such a claim. This only circumvents the reasons for allowing a pre-
dissolution action for mismanagement. Once again, creditors are prej-
udiced, but this time by being subordinated to the rights of the in-
dividual partners.
Recognizing the right as a claim of the entity would be a better
solution. The derivative action would give the courts an opportunity
to provide an equitable remedy to all, partners and creditors. If an
act of a managing partner affects all members of the partnership
proportionately, the claim belongs to the entity, and the entity is the
proper party to bring the suit. Derivative actions give members of an
entity, not normally involved in management, an opportunity to protect
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the interest of the business when management is unable or unwilling
to do so. Thirty-nine states have seen the need for such a device in
the context of limited partnerships to facilitate the enforcement of
fiduciary duties. Louisiana already has the needed legislation to join
these other states. Hopefully, when the next Dupuis-type fact pattern
arises, the courts will be persuaded to recognize a derivative action.
B. Troy Villa
